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Abstract 
In an increasingly complex literature exploring the geographies of socially constructed scale, 
interest has focused on the relationship between scale, power and the contested political 
terrains through which these relations are played out.  In this paper, I argue that these 
interactions must be understood in specific contexts, where shifts in scale are inextricably 
linked to shifts in the sources and instruments of power.  By applying a scale perspective to the 
analysis of recent industrial relations legislation in Australia, I show that the nature and 
direction of rescaling is ‘fixed’ by the powers of institutional actors and the scope of their 
jurisdictions. I then draw on the distinctively scaled relations of the Australian context to assess 
the extent to which Australia’s national rescaling processes can be seen as representing a 
process of convergence toward universal ‘spaces of neo-liberalism’. 
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Introduction 
In November 2005, over 200,000 working people marched through the streets of Melbourne, 
Australia to express their anger at the Howard government’s draconian labour market re-
regulation, which abolishes many of the rights won by workers in the preceding one hundred 
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years of industrial arbitration. Whilst the public debate about these reforms has focused on their 
direct employment and labour market implications, this paper assesses them from a broader 
perspective with a view to illuminating the complex relationship between politics, scale and 
power.  By locating the reform agenda in a historical and political-economy context, the paper 
aims to contribute to the identification of constructive avenues of resistance.  
The paper portrays the revolutionary transformation of the Australian industrial 
relations landscape as a complex, multi-faceted and contradictory process in which the national 
government has drawn on new sources of power to wrest authority from the regional States 
and decentralize industrial relations practices to the workplace level. These changes have been 
justified as a necessary consequence of globalization (Howard 2005) and interpreted as 
superimposing neo-liberal policy settings on the Australian space-economy (Mack 2005). This 
analysis, in contrast, reveals the extent to which the Australian case diverges from Brenner and 
Theodore’s (2002) international neo-liberal prototype. Rather than ‘hollowing out’ the national 
scale, the re-regulation of employment and industrial relations in Australia has shifted the locus 
of power toward the national scale by harnessing a previously untapped source of regulatory 
power: the ‘Corporations’ power vested in the Commonwealth by the Australian Constitution. 
The mobilization of this power potentially enables the national state to legislate in a wide range 
of matters relating to the governance of firms (corporations), to strengthen the depth and scope 
of its control over employment and industrial relations practices, and to rescale the practices of 
regulation to the enterprise, workplace and individual worker. As a consequence, geometries of 
power between capital and labour have shifted to the advantage of capital (as institutionalized 
in firms) and between the Commonwealth and regional States to the advantage of the 
Commonwealth. Unpacking the history of these changes highlights the need for a finer 
appreciation of the relationships between differently scaled modalities of power, legal 
jurisdictions and political forces.   
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The paper makes four arguments. First, whilst accepting the inextricable link between 
scale and power (Herod and Wright 2004), it sees the powers of contemporary actors—and 
therefore their potential agency in the reconfiguration of scaled structures—as both constrained 
and shaped by histories that were not of their making. This observation draws attention to the 
sources, scope and diversity of different expressions of state power and their relationships to 
legal and territorial jurisdictions. Second, therefore, the paper examines the interdependencies 
between political, economic and legal power within the Federal scale and illuminates the spatial 
repercussions of their shifting relations. Third, it considers the uneven durability of each form of 
power’s spatial and temporal reach. Fourth, it highlights the national scale’s continuing pre-
eminence in regulatory, economic and political processes.  
The discussion proceeds as follows. The next section critically examines scaled 
perspectives in contemporary geographies of labour. Section Three then details the history of 
industrial relations reform in Australia, describing it through the lens of rescaling and power 
geometries and stressing the connections between these processes and the rise of neo-liberal 
ideologies and policies. Section Four examines the implications of these changes, leading to 
the conclusion that national scalar fixes are not amenable to rapid reinterpretation or 
uncomplicated reconfiguration. 
The Uses of Power In Labour Geographies 
 
The literatures associated with the ‘regulation school’ have been influential in framing 
understandings of marketization, privatization and neo-liberal labour market reforms. 
Regulation approaches are attuned to the processes of uneven development that drive 
capitalist growth, are sensitive to the formative role of space and spatialities, and are alert to 
the processes of reterritorialization and rescaling that are inevitably associated with industrial 
restructuring (Brenner 1998). They also highlight the complex interdependencies and ‘tangled 
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webs’ of codependent relations that shape the reconfiguration of institutional structures (Boyer 
1992). Swyngedouw’s (1997) geographical extensions of regulation theory incorporate an 
appreciation of space, scale and power in a way that has particular resonance for the study of 
neo-liberal industrial relations reforms. He envisions the spatial outcomes of neo-liberal reforms 
as a process of glocalization: a dual shift from the national to both the global and local scales 
simultaneously. Here, scale is both the arena and outcome of contested social action. 
Herod and Wright (2004) also draw on spatialized variants of regulation theory to 
explore the relationship between scale and power. They understand scale in relational terms, 
as comprising of dense networks of interpersonal and inter-institutional relationships that span 
and interpenetrate from the local to the global. Scale ‘matters’ to understanding the changing 
nature of industrial relations because unions and employers are both geographic and strategic 
agents engaged in social interactions that shape the spaces and institutions in which they 
interact. Their changing associational foci incessantly construct and re-construct scale. In this 
theoretical variant, since scale is socially constructed and malleable, so too is the arena in 
which contested political struggles are played out.   
These approaches provide a framework from which to explore the changing power 
relations between unions, employer associations and the national regulatory structures that 
underpin neo-liberal re-regulation. They suggest that shifting power relationships and the 
processes of re-regulation must be theorized together and across multiple geographical scales 
in a manner sensitive to the shifting ‘power geometries’ between capital and labour (Berndt 
2000; after Massey 1993). Comprehending Australia’s contemporary industrial relations 
changes thus requires an appreciation of the multi-scalar nature of re-regulation and the 
complexities of the associated changes in power relations. It also requires teasing out how 
different modalities of state power influence the relationship between capital and labour (in their 
institutional expressions as firms, unions and employer groups). In addition, the analysis in this 
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paper extends and reworks existing understandings by incorporating three further 
considerations.  
First, existing theorizations do not interrogate sufficiently how different sources and 
modalities of power shape actors’ capacities for scale transformation, or how temporalities—the 
histories, timings and rates of change of continuing codependent relationships—influence 
processes of scale transformation. When Gibson-Graham (2004), for example, advocates 
greater emphasis on the inter-constitutive nature of scale and rescaling in specific contexts, 
they stress the malleability of scale and its dependence on the minutiae of everyday power 
relations between actors. Yet such an appreciation could just as easily highlight the durable 
nature of structural couplings and the inflexible scalar ‘fixes’ that bind groups of actors and 
institutions together in at least partially determined developmental trajectories. Although 
national states can alter their sources of power and adapt their regulatory structures to new 
circumstances, their transformative options are constrained by laws and histories that both 
underpin and maintain existing scaled structures.  
Second, existing scale theory does not step inside existing jurisdictional scales to 
interrogate how the changing nature of state power—as the outcome of conflicts between 
social, economic and political objectives—shapes processes of rescaling.  Regulation theories 
have been criticized for conceptualizing the state as somehow external to its object and as 
creating an overly artificial division between the state and the economy (Cox 2002). A parallel 
argument can be made with respect to the division between the state and the law. For Clark 
(1989:329) the links between the state and the law are ‘indissoluble.’ In Blomley’s (1994:36) 
analysis, the law asserts an imagined and unifying social and cultural homogeneity and 
displays and a ‘deep aversion’ to the heterogeneity characteristic of actual social processes. As 
such, it functions as a ‘territory’ with ‘closure’ from political and economic concerns. In the 
regulation of the employment relation, however, where the law meets the imperatives of 
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economic management, maintaining judicial independence is always fraught: political changes 
that shift the state’s internal configurations of power also stimulate reconfigurations in the 
relationship between the state and the institutions created by it to manage the relationship 
between capital and labour.    
Third, existing theorizations of scale generalize patterns of neo-liberal restructuring and 
their associated transformations of scale without sufficient consideration of the unique 
trajectories and spatial logics of different national experiments. As a result, national differences 
tend to be explained as different timings in the diffusion of a neo-liberal script that inevitably 
moves each nation closer to a (US or trans-Atlantic) global form, rather than seeing them as 
distinctive, path dependent trajectories that reflect real differences in the foundational political, 
economic and legal structures of nations.   
The following description of Australia’s system of industrial relations regulation links the 
history of struggles over scales of jurisdiction to broader struggles over the social, political and 
economic direction of the nation. The discussion highlights the decisive role of the Australian 
Constitution in framing legal jurisdictions and defining the limits to the malleability of the power 
it confers on actors and their scales of activity. The distribution of powers set out in the 
Constitution were established in another time and from another worldview, and create structural 
constraints that are independent of—but nonetheless crucial to—the relational networks of 
contemporary political, economic and social relationships. Recent neo-liberal reforms to 
Australia’s spaces of industrial relations regulation deploy a previously unused head of power—
power over the activities of ‘Corporations’—to rework scaled configurations of power over the 
employment relation. This has resulted in the up-scaling of power to the national jurisdiction 
and an intensification of the link between legal regulation, politics and economic policymaking.  
Recalibrating Intergovernmental Relations 
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 ‘Australia’ is a federation created in 1901 by its constituent States. The Australian Constitution 
reflects the political desire, at Federation, to create a durable democracy based on the 
Westminster parliamentary model. The Australian Constitution defines the powers of the nation 
state (the Commonwealth) relative to regional governments (the States). It vests the national 
scale government with exclusive powers over inter-State matters, but preserves State authority 
over internal matters. This division of powers can be revised only by a national referendum or 
by a revised interpretation of the Constitution by the High Court. The capacity to ‘re-scale’ 
states and federal powers is therefore greatly constrained.  
At the national scale, the Australian Federal system has been structured by the 
‘Separation of Powers’ doctrine: it vests legislative power in the Parliament, executive power in 
the (British) Queen, and judicial power in the High Court. This framework has defined the 
nation’s internal power relations and shaped the character of the national state. By positioning 
the legal system as independent of the political system, it separates individual rights from 
political-economic realities. For Bowles and Gintis (1986) this separation is a fundamental 
condition of a democratic society. The separation of powers is replicated in each of the States, 
creating an ordered division of political and legal systems.  
In industrial relations matters, the States and the Federal Government have concurrent 
powers – a situation that has created a regulatory landscape characterised by long-standing 
tensions between jurisdictions.1 As a result, the industrial relations system has always been 
multi-faceted, comprising Federal and State (regional) and (sometimes) industry-based 
regulations as well as a plethora of informal workplace arrangements.  However, every issue 
that arises in industrial relations is debated and resolved in a specific jurisdiction. The spatially 
situated and scaled social practices relating to industrial relations laws must therefore be 
understood in the context of the shifting history of the relationships between jurisdictions.   
 8 
The development of Australia’s industrial relations system can be understood as 
organized historically in three phases: first, as a negotiated reconciliation of the conflicting 
interests of capital and labour in the Keynesian Australian Settlement; second, as a hybrid 
structure intended to increase ‘flexibility’ while retaining distributional equity; and third, as an 
individualized and localized system weighted in favor of capital. The distinguishing 
characteristics of these phases are summarized in Table 1. In each phase, legislative 
frameworks have been underpinned by different heads of power and different strategies of 
accumulation: in turn, Keynesian, hybrid quasi-Corporatist and neo-liberal. The phases also 
demarcate the changing position of the labour market in the national economy and the 
changing position of the national economy in the global economy. 
 
Put Table I about here 
 
Since Federation, Australia’s industrial relations structure has gravitated toward the 
national scale. Bipartisan political support for national regulation has reflected both an 
awareness of the inefficiencies of duplication and a perceived need to bring the scale of labour 
regulation into alignment with the already national scale of macro-economic and social security 
regulation (Creighton and Stewart 2005; Williams 1998). Changing power relations within the 
field of industrial relations reflect a wider trend to the centralisation of power at the national 
scale. 
The Australian Settlement 
In the early 20th century, Australia’s distinctive and highly interventionist system of industrial 
relations regulation developed as the central re-distributive mechanism of the nation’s strategy 
of accumulation. This set it apart from the industrial relations environment in other western 
economies (Macintyre 1989).   
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From Federation until the 1980s—or more precisely, from the Conciliation and 
Arbitration Act (1904) to the Industrial Relations Act (1988)—Federal intervention in the field of 
industrial relations relied on s. 51 (xxxv) of the Constitution, which gives the Commonwealth 
power over “conciliation and arbitration for the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes 
extending beyond the limits of one State.” In the early years of Federation, the extent of 
Federal power was constrained by the High Court’s narrow interpretation of the wording of this 
section of the Constitution; in particular, its understanding of the words conciliation, arbitration, 
prevention, settlement, industrial, dispute, and the phrase ‘beyond the limits of one State’ 
(Williams 1998). In these early years, the High Court followed the principle of ‘reserved State 
powers’, which preserved the States’ authority over wage setting—based on powers enshrined 
in their Constitutions—and restricted the Commonwealth’s power to the determination of 
minimum standards in inter-State dispute settlement..  
As the Federal system became established, new interpretations expanded the scope of 
its powers. Federal deference to State authority was modified in 1920 when the High Court 
found, under s. 109 of the Constitution, that in matters involving parallel jurisdictions the 
Commonwealth’s authority would prevail.2 Thereafter, State and Federal systems operated 
concurrently, usually in a spirit of cooperation, but with Federal leadership (despite the 
relatively weak basis of its authority). The scope of national industrial regulation continued to 
increase over time as unions developed a system of inter-state ‘paper disputes’ fabricated with 
the express purpose of triggering Federal intervention. Meanwhile the Commonwealth sought 
to increase its powers over industrial relations, but failed in four separate referenda (most 
recently in 1946) to gain public support for the necessary Constitutional amendment. 
Nonetheless, Federal ascendancy was consolidated in 1962 when the High Court ruled that the 
Constitution grants the Commonwealth a degree of immunity from State laws.3 As successive 
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High Court decisions gradually reinterpreted the Constitution, the effective power of the 
national scale increased, as did the separation between Federal and State jurisdictions.   
In this context, the industrial relations regulator, the Federal Arbitration Commission 
created a ‘regulatory space’ that functioned to referee the inherently uneven power relations 
between labour and capital. After taking the divergent perspectives of government, union and 
employer interests into account, its decisions set wages and conditions of employment (known 
as making an Award). The historic Harvester Decision of 1907 secured the enduring link 
between wages levels and the cost of living that underpinned Australian social life throughout 
the twentieth century.   
Within this scaled division of power, then, the national system of ‘arbitration and 
conciliation’ developed, along with industry protection and migration, as a pillar of the 
Keynesian accumulation strategy known as the Australian Settlement.  The system maintained 
industrial peace by balancing workers’ needs for social protection with capital’s capacity to pay 
for improvements to wages and working conditions (Macintyre and Mitchell 1989). The 
Arbitration Commission—and the powers under which it operated—assumed an adversarial 
relationship between capital and labour. The Commission adopted an inquisitorial approach to 
task of mediating between their conflicting purposes (Isaac 1994). Under the Separation of 
Powers doctrine, the Commission’s decisions were largely independent of political influences 
and did not necessarily accord with the short-term policy objectives of the government.  
By the 1960s, the minimum wages and conditions of most Australian workers were 
either set at Federal level in regular National Wage Cases or followed their lead in State-based 
Awards (Hancock and Richardson 2004). The Australian system was characterized by 
compulsory arbitration, a high incidence of multi-employer collective bargaining (Traxler 1996) 
and comprehensive Award coverage that extended regulation to issues that in other nations 
are covered by the social welfare system (Hartog and Theeuwes 1993). Needs-based basic 
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wage rates were modified using agreed skill-based occupational wage relativities, with the 
wages of a city-based (metals trade) fitter providing the benchmark (Macken 1989). The 
maintenance of occupational wage relativities brought stability to the nation’s industrial 
structure. This system resulted in Australian workplaces having a high level of Award coverage 
(over 80% of all employees). The regulatory system facilitated the creation of a bargaining 
framework that institutionalised the role of trade unions. It enabled the most powerful unions to 
secure Awards that would then ‘flow’ to less strategically well-positioned sectors and industries. 
Over time, the system generated a complex mix of industrial awards, each with specific 
occupational, spatial and/or sectoral application.  
The arbitral model relied on the political support of its constituent actors. It was 
supported by unions—although not without tensions (see Ellem et al 2004)—because it 
enabled wages to keep pace with the cost of living and sheltered weaker segments of the 
labour market. After the economic crisis of the 1931 Depression, it came to be supported by 
business, too, because stabilised the economy and moderated the incidence of direct industrial 
action. Wage regulation was effectively the quid pro quo for tariff protection (Plowman 1989). It 
was supported by government because it regulated the rate of consumption within the 
Keynesian accumulation strategy. The system’s ordered relativities maintained a ‘family’ wage 
structure linked to the cost of living, whilst its redistributive function reduced inter-regional and 
inter-sectoral wage differences. At that time, the redistributive mechanism was important 
because much of Australia’s wealth was generated in the rural agricultural sector (wool and 
wheat production).   
The centralised system also empowered these institutional actors. It recognised, by 
registration, both the unions and employer groups that represented their constituencies in 
collective bargaining. It institutionalised their roles and encouraged them to direct their energies 
to the national scale. To improve the effectiveness of their bargaining both sides harnessed 
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specialist legal expertise. Legal intermediaries subsequently assumed a crucial role in defining 
the nature and scale of industrial relations practice (Teicher 2004). The structure also 
encouraged union and employer organisations to engage with political actors at both national 
and State levels to maintain the institutional structure and bend its practices to their objectives. 
At the same time, the dispute-based structure allowed for (and assumed) local scale 
negotiations and agreements. Although individual workplaces were often governed by multiple 
unions and multiple awards, the structure preserved management prerogative and encouraged 
status-linked rights. It empowered those segments of labour that were positioned at critical 
points in the production processes—clickers in the boot trades, for example—who could 
exercise industrial muscle with immediate effect. This in turn encouraged the formation of small 
occupational (craft) unions. A handful of powerful unions often won over-award payments. 
Within most workplaces, however, union authority was underpinned by national wage 
regulation and compulsory unionism rather than by a culture of activism. Since interlocking 
federal and State Awards applied to all workers, regardless of individual union membership, the 
system succeeded in defusing local level wage disputes. As a result, according to Clegg 
(1976:66), workplace activism was weak: the role of workplace union representatives was 
typically restricted to “collect[ing] union dues and to report[ing] grievances to branch officers.”   
Overall, Australia’s organised system of ‘arbitration and conciliation’ was more 
structured and more juridified than the systems that developed in otherwise comparable 
Western economies. Despite similarities arising from a shared origin in the Common Law, the 
generalised scope and re-distributive functions of the Australian system distinguished it from 
the institutionalised localness and spatial heterogeneity that persisted in other countries 
(Hartog and Theeuwes 1993). 
Crisis and Reform 
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The economic crisis of the 1970s and the associated changes in the division of labour put the 
arbitral system under increasing pressure. In the late 1960s, unions had vigorously opposed 
the Arbitration Commission’s attempts to stem wage increases. In 1975, under the short-lived 
leftist Labor Whitlam administration, the Commission introduced a Wage Indexation system 
that linked wage adjustments directly to cost of living increases. As wage rates escalated with 
the ‘stagflation’ crisis in the economy, stakeholders’ support for wage indexation waned. The 
Commission consequently assented to the Fraser Liberal Government’s 1981 proposal to 
‘Freeze’ wages    
The crisis of 1970s sharpened political divisions and united the union movement 
behind its peak organisation, the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) (Briggs 2004).  
The labour movement moderated its political stance and aligned more closely with the 
Australian Labor Party (ALP) and in 1981, the ACTU entered into a formal cooperative 
agreement with the ALP. At that time, the union movement was altering its complexion as the 
activist leaders of the previous era were being replaced by university-educated industrial 
relations professionals. At the same time, the structures of ‘conciliation and arbitration’ were 
struggling to adapt to the new social and economic realities. In 1983, for example, the High 
Court widened its interpretation of the word ‘industry’ to approve bringing the full range of white 
collar occupations into the arbitration system.4 This new interpretation had the effect of altering 
power relations within the union movement as white collar and service unions expanded 
relative to craft and industrial unions. 
After the 1983 federal election, the Hawke Labor government came to power. The 
Hawke administration was committed to structural reforms that would address the weaknesses 
in the Australian macro-economy. It embarked on a new accumulation strategy combining 
macro-economic reform and the liberalisation of industry, monetary, migration and wages 
policies with micro-economic reforms intended to revitalise the nation’s workplaces. Soon after 
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taking office, it entered into the first of a series of Prices and Incomes Accords with unions. In 
this social pact, unions agreed to sacrifice direct wage increases in return for increases in the 
‘social wage’ of state-provided benefits. In addition, the incoming government held a National 
Economic Summit to garner support for its policy agenda and created new consultative 
institutions such as EPAC (the tripartite Economic and Planning Advisory Council) that would 
coordinate economic planning, wages, employment and industry policy-making. These 
structures empowered peak bodies—the ACTU representing workers and Business Council of 
Australia representing employers—to deliberate on behalf of their constituencies. In turn, these 
changes concentrated political power in the hands of leadership elites and encouraged the 
hierarchization of power relations within the various institutions of labour and business (see 
Crouch 1982).  
The Accord was renegotiated on seven occasions between 1983 and 1996. At each 
renegotiation, the federal scale grew in influence and the industrial relations system was 
brought into closer alignment with economic and social policy concerns. This process was 
assisted by a 1985 inquiry into the industrial relations framework that highlighted the 
inadequacies of the dispute-based ‘arbitration and conciliation’ apparatus (Commonwealth of 
Australia 1985). The inquiry found that the system had delivered wage stability and 
employment benefits to full- time male workers but had also exacerbated the deeply gendered 
segmentation of the Australian labour market (see Kirkby 1989). The system could not regulate 
the growing incidence of non-standard employment arrangements (managers, marginal 
workers, and those engaged in various forms of quasi-employment) or regulate with confidence 
in areas beyond the scope its core powers, such as the employer-employee relation (such as 
employment insecurity and unfair dismissal) or relationships internal to the workplace (such as 
harassment and discrimination). These failings were attributed primarily to the Constitutional 
limits on Federal power.   
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To address these deficiencies, the federal Labor government turned to Constitutional 
experts to identify means by which it could extend its range of effective powers. In the 1980s, 
the Labor government experimented with previously untapped powers, deploying the 
Commonwealth’s Constitutional powers over ‘external affairs’ (s.xxix), ‘corporations’ (s.xx), and 
‘interstate and overseas trade’ (s.i) to matters relating to the regulation of employment.  The 
‘Corporations’ power proved to be the most efficacious. It enabled the federal Parliament to 
legislate with respect to “Foreign, trading and financial corporations formed within the limits of 
the Commonwealth,” and granted the Commonwealth jurisdiction over a wide range of activities 
of incorporated bodies. Progressive new laws governing equal opportunity, anti-discrimination, 
unfair dismissal, training and redundancy drew on these newly-harnessed sources of power in 
addition to the ‘conciliation and arbitration’ power. But these reforms were not without their 
critics.  Legal commentators began to raise concerns about ‘juridification’ or the increasing 
density and complexity of the law. They also questioned the appropriateness of some 
international treaties to Australia’s circumstances (see Mitchell 1998).  
Meanwhile, business interests became increasingly concerned about the costs of 
compliance and the intrusions on managerial prerogative that had been created by the 
extension of employment regulations. As legislation proliferated, the business sector—now led 
by the powerful Business Council of Australia (BCA), a group dominated by large, export-
oriented firms with transnational links—became increasingly vocal in its demands for labour 
market reform. It advocated greater workplace ‘flexibility’, understood as the decentralisation of 
the wages and incomes system (BCA 1988, 1991). At the same time, union support for the 
Accord was coming under increasing stress as the material benefits of economic restructuring 
failed to trickle down to workers despite soaring business profit rates. The ACTU was finding it 
increasingly difficult to maintain the support of those unions powerful enough to secure wage 
increases outside the Accord structure (Dabscheck 1995). In this politically-charged context, 
 16 
each of the major stakeholders in the arbitration and conciliation system came to support the 
partial decentralisation of wage determination.   
The decentralisation process began with the 1986 National Wage Case (Accord III), 
after which, in 1987, a ‘two-tier’ system of wages determination was introduced. It linked 
second tier wage increases to productivity improvements (that is, to evidence of workplace 
restructuring and work intensification), a move that necessarily involved negotiation at the 
workplace scale. This concept was extended in 1988 and 1989 via the ‘Structural Efficiency 
Principle’ – an innovation that further promoted workplace restructuring (Accord IV). It 
preserved the Accord structure but freed it from automatic ‘flow-on’ wage increases. A series of 
landmark reinterpretations by the High Court enabled non-wage benefits such as 
superannuation to be incorporated into the Award structure as a substitute for direct wage 
increases.5 The Industrial Relations Act (1988) (C’th) (IRA) responded to the Hancock Report’s 
recommendations. It permitted certified collective agreements without the need for a dispute to 
animate the discussion, thereby shifting some aspects of industrial regulation to the enterprise 
level. It also altered the structure of the industrial court (Mitchell and Rimmer 1990).  The IRA 
drew extensively on the Commonwealth’s ‘Corporations’ power to make demands on 
employers that would have been of doubtful legality under the ‘conciliation and arbitration’ 
power.  
In 1990, under Accord Mark VI, the ACTU shifted ground to accept and recognise the 
increasing incidence of enterprise-level bargaining, effectively relinquishing its exclusive 
powers over multi-employer bargaining (Bell 1991). In 1991, the complexion of the federal 
government changed when Paul Keating—a Labor politician sympathetic to neo-liberal 
ideologies—replaced Bob Hawke as Prime Minister. His government’s acceleration of product 
market liberalisation in May 1991 resulted in rapid increases in unemployment as many 
domestic firms failed. In October 1991, at the peak of the ‘recession that Australia had to have’, 
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the Commission also recognised the shift to enterprise scale bargaining when it reluctantly 
established Enterprise Bargaining Principles, a set of procedures for collective bargaining that 
encouraged enterprise level negotiation within a centrally managed framework. Further 
amendments to the IRA in 1992 then permitted Enterprise Bargaining without reference to the 
Commission’s Principles. After the Keating government was re-elected in 1993 it introduced 
further liberalisations in The Industrial Relations Reform Act (1993) (C'th). These provided for 
both union and non-union collective agreements, made awards subservient to workplace 
agreements, and effectively demoted the Award structure to the role of ‘safety net.’  This 
legislations also drew on the federal ‘Corporations’ power to impose direct obligations on 
employers in the areas of minimum wages, equal pay, termination of employment, 
discrimination and parental leave. At the same time, it curtailed strike action and limited the 
power of unions by effectively preventing multi-employer bargaining. The powers of the 
Commission were also further diminished. This legislation foreshadowed the end of Australia’s 
‘arbitral model’ of industrial regulation and tilted the balance of power toward employers. 
Thus, in the crucial years between 1988 to 1993, the federal industrial relations system 
reconfigured into a hybrid structure blending arbitration with enterprise-level bargaining, but 
establishing a trajectory in which enterprise-oriented reforms became the accepted solution to 
the contradictions of national regulations. These reforms were made possible by the 
deployment of the ‘Corporations’ power, the use of which was validated by the High Court in 
1989 in respect of a limited range of industrial relations matters.6 These changes strengthened 
of the depth and scope of the federal jurisdiction, shifted the balance of power toward the 
Federal scale and diminished the separation between the law and economic and social policy-
making. They increased federal power because they did not require the existence of a dispute 
to animate intervention; there was no necessity for collective agreements to settle disputes; 
and there was no need to ‘recognise’ the institutional power of unions and employer groups. As 
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the institutions of the arbitral model and the philosophy of negotiated settlement were sidelined, 
institutional power relations changed in ways that weakened the voice of organised labour and 
employer groups.   
Neo-liberal Roll-out 
The Labor Government was defeated in the 1996 federal election after losing the support of 
business interests. The Howard Liberal administration came to power with a commitment to 
implement even more radical reform in the labour market. Its Workplace Relations And Other 
Legislation Amendment Act 1996 (C'th) (hereafter WRA) promoted further decentralisation and 
de-collectivisation of labour regulation (Mitchell 1998). The WRA relied primarily on the 
‘Corporations’ power and largely abandoned the use of both the ‘conciliation and arbitration’ 
and the ‘external affairs’ powers.  
The WRA added also an additional scale of regulation in the form of individual 
contracts called Australian Workplace Agreements (AWAs). It restricted the number of 
‘allowable matters’ in industrial Awards in the Federal jurisdiction and thereby constrained the 
scope of issues over which the Commission could act—restricting it to the supervision of 
enterprise agreements and the certification of individual agreements. The WRA’s recognition of 
non-union agreements further undermined the power of unions and impeded the ACTU’s 
capacity to represent its affiliates’ interests (Ellem et al 2004; McCallum 1997). In practice, the 
WRA created an additional level in an already multi-scalar regulatory structure. Thus, it 
increased the complexity of industrial relations law, extended the process of juridification and 
expanded the law by increasing its density and differentiation across a range of scales. As a 
result, a sole employee could theoretically be governed by multiple and perhaps competing 
mechanisms (see Mitchell 1998).   
After its re-election in 2004, the Howard Government gained control of both Houses of 
Parliament, enabling it, for the first time, to pass legislation without the support of the minor 
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parties in the Senate. This consolidation of federal political power enabled a new round of 
reform to labour and industrial relations regulation. The deceptively named Workplace 
Relations Amendment (WorkChoices) Act 2005 (hereafter Workchoices)—abolished all but the 
most basic employment standards and introduced sanctions that curtailed the activities of 
unions and other advocates. 
• The number of ‘allowable matters’ in Federal industrial awards was reduced to five 
(specifying minimum conditions for wages, ordinary hours, and leave entitlements). 
Only three apply to casual employees. Issues no longer ‘allowable’ in awards include 
notice of termination, long service leave and superannuation, restrictions on the use of 
part-time or contract labour, and negotiations over skill-based career paths.7  
• The Arbitration Commission has been effectively replaced by a politically appointed 
Australian Fair Pay Commission charged with determining ‘fair’ minimum wages. 
These are now defined as wages that encourage productivity, maintain low inflation 
and promote international competitiveness. The cost of living is no longer a criterion in 
wage setting. The ‘no disadvantage’ test that had limited the negative impacts the 1996 
WRA was abolished.   
• Individual employment contracts (AWAs) formalize Common Law associations and 
override collective agreements and Awards. AWAs extend the penetration of 
formalized regulation by bringing aspects of the employment relation previously 
governed by the Common Law in the contractual framework. This devolution of 
regulation to the individual level actually increases the relative importance of common 
law employment contracts and reinvigorates a master-servant relationship in which 
power is intrinsically weighted to the employer’s advantage (Mitchell and Fetter 2003).   
• Employers are not obliged to ‘recognize’ or otherwise acknowledge unions, which 
means that Australians effectively no longer have a ‘right’ to engage in collective 
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bargaining.  Industrial action, already curtailed in 1996 except in a narrow range of 
‘protected’ actions, has been further restrained by onerous administrative requirements 
including secret ballots. Other union activity—including the right of entry to premises—
has been severely curtailed. Unfair dismissal laws now apply only to large employers.  
• Workchoices shifts bargaining to the individual scale but relies increasingly on 
surveillance, sanctions and the criminalization of union activity. Unions requesting that 
unfair dismissal remedies, trade union training, or job security be included in collective 
agreements now face criminal sanctions.  
• Via its grounding in the ‘Corporations’ power, Workchoices over-rides most State level 
employment and industrial relations legislation. 
In sum, the strengthening of Federal powers over employment matters has enabled the 
conservative Howard government to introduce harsh regulations at the national scale, to shift 
the practice (but not the power) of industrial relations regulation to the local and individual 
scales. These reforms reduce the labour movement’s political influence and its capacity to 
organize: they have actively empowered capital and disempowered labour.  
Implications 
 
This changing landscape of industrial relations demonstrates that sites of practice and sites of 
power are not necessary the same, and that the surface process of ‘glocalisation’ can conceal 
a deeper process of national empowerment as the state seeks to bend its population to the 
perceived imperatives of market-led globalization. The central thrust of these reforms is not 
simply deregulation but de-collectivisation through the deliberate exclusion of collective 
bargaining within and beyond the workplace (Cooper 2005). Therefore, these changes must be 
interpreted as an extension of (draconian) federal power rather than as the devolution of 
responsibility to the workplace. As Gamble (1988) argued, a ‘free’ and decentralized market 
economy requires the intervention of a strong state.8 The reforms have abolished the 
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redistributive function accorded to wages policies in the Australian Settlement and 
consequently resulted in increasing wage inequalities and declining employment security.  
Rescaling the State 
As well as reconfiguring the power relations between the state, the union movement and 
employers, the changes threaten autonomy of the regional States. It is often the case in 
Australia, given the structure of its electoral and parliamentary systems, that the national 
government faces politically hostile State administrations. This structure is generally defended 
on the basis that it provides a degree of political stability by acting as a protection against 
radical change at either scale. Most States retain significant powers over and interest in the 
employment relationship. Their opposition to the Federal expansion under Workchoices is a 
‘States rights’ as well as a ‘workers’ rights’ issue. In 2006, the States combined forces in a High 
Court challenge to the constitutionality of use of the ‘Corporations’ power in the Workchoices 
reforms. This was not successful, as expected, given the now conservative majority in the High 
Court. Other strategies are developing. For example, in a show of cooperation, the States have 
entered into a corporatist agreement with peak manufacturing industry groups and unions 
(www.nationalmanufacturing.org). The Victorian State Government has considered the 
introduction of Human Rights legislation, which, among other things, will protect the right of 
Victorians to join a union. Legal research centres are examining further options for State and 
local intervention to protect workers’ rights.   
Opposing the Workchoices reforms is important for the States because Federal 
empowerment under the ‘Corporations’ power creates a precedent that could undermine the 
States’ jurisdictions in a wide range of regulatory applications. However, the extent of Federal 
empowerment remains uncertain. Although the High Court has rejected a narrow view of the 
Corporations power, which would see its application restricted to ‘trading’ activities, it has not 
embraced a broad interpretation in which any or all activity of a corporation can be regulated 
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(Williams 2005).9  McCallum (2005) argues that the Corporations power could not be used as 
the basis for universal labour regulations, such as the setting of a minimum wage, because it 
applies only to ‘corporations’ or persons engaged in conduct with ‘corporations’. According to 
Williams (1998), the contemporary changes are creating a regulatory vacuum that will promote 
the devolution of responsibility back to the State level. The Corporations’ power does not apply 
to unincorporated businesses and there is uncertainty about its application to public 
instrumentalities – organisations that together employ perhaps 20% of the Australian 
workforce. Since the ACTU will continue to seek direction from State-level arbitrators for these 
segments of the workforce, some form of State level arbitration will continue to exist (Combet 
2006).  
Rescaling and Labour Organisations 
The Workchoices reforms reinforce a trajectory of worker disempowerment that coincides with 
Australia’s new market accumulation strategy and the Corporation-based shift in 
Commonwealth power. The Accord years increased the ACTU’s power to act in the industrial 
and political arena and increased its power relative to individual unions.  But this undermined 
the authority of State-level Trades and Labour Councils and weakened State- and city level 
union activism. Under the productivity-related objectives of the Accords, unions had agreed to 
substantial workplace and Award restructuring. Union amalgamations between 1989 and 1999 
reduced the number of unions affiliated to the ACTU from 299 to 52 as unions amalgamated 
and moved from a craft- to industry- to sector-based structure.  
The shift away from craft-based unionism altered workplace power relations and 
disempowered those occupations that had previously held leading roles in the arbitration-based 
structure. Accord’s real wage cuts undermined support for unionism, stifled workplace activism 
and accelerated the decline of union membership, but the latest reforms have now also 
weakened the ACTU and exposed its power as an artefact of the regulatory structure (Berndt 
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2000). Macdonald et al (2001) argue that the introduction of formal bargaining at the enterprise 
and workplace scales has actually reduced the amount of informal, cooperative negotiation 
happening in workplaces. There is increasing evidence that Workchoices is having a negative 
impact on productivity as the loss of worker voice inhibits innovation and as employees’ 
declining sense of mutual obligation jeopardises firms’ capacity to manage effectively (ABC 
2007 see also Peetz 1998; Callus and Lansbury 2002).    
The new framework creates an incentive for labour to organise at the workplace scale, 
where the practicalities of enterprise-level bargaining favour the formation of one-union sites 
and firm-based unions. The changed circumstances are inducing unions to reach down to their 
constituencies and to purposefully build autonomy from state institutions so that in the future 
their power will be less reliant on institutional recognition. They also encourage unions to 
organise outside the workplace and turn to grass-roots political organising that unites the 
workplace with the community (Cooper and Ellem 2006). However, while this localisation of 
union strategy brings the Australian union movement closer to the strategies of unions in the 
United States and Europe, these innovations are being introduced to a context largely 
unfamiliar with workplace-based activism.  
Spaces of Neo-Liberalism? 
As these changes have unfolded, Australia’s structures of industrial relations regulation are 
transforming in ways that echo the experiences of neo-liberal reform in other places. The 
relationship between business interests and federal government has become a more direct 
and more structural coupling as the national state and firms pursue common and 
complementary strategies. Both are now buying policy advice and anti-labour strategies from 
the same consultants and neo-liberal think-tanks (Kelly 2005). Union strategies too are 
increasingly influenced by the United States’ experience (Combet 2006). This has led some 
Australian commentators to view Australia’s reforms as an example of the importation of neo-
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liberal policy strategies to the Australian context (Mack 2005). Certainly the underlying faith in 
market processes is similar to Thatcherist or Reaganite reforms. There is no doubt, moreover, 
that the idea of increasing Federal powers by harnessing the ‘Corporations’ power was linked 
an awareness of the broad interpretations that the American Supreme Court has adopted to 
the ‘Commercial’ clause of the US Constitution (Williams 2005:205).   
However, the unique aspects of Australia’s reforms make it impossible to view them as 
simply an example of ‘fast policy’ transfer (Peck 2001). First, the individualization of Australia’s 
employment relations goes further than other jurisdictions toward commodifying labour (power) 
in the marketplace. The contractual formalisation of master-servant relations is in many ways 
the antithesis of market liberalisation, instead return to a classical relationship. Second, the 
Corporatist basis of the Australian reconfiguration shifts the very basis of state power, so 
driving reform deeper than Brenner and Theodore’s (2002) ‘spaces of neo-liberalism’. Briggs 
and Buchanan (2005) argue that Australia’s changes cannot be viewed as a local variation on 
the theme of trans-Atlantic labour market deregulation because the shift to individual contracts 
represents a qualitative shift in the form of regulation, rather than simply an intensification of 
existing regulatory mechanisms. Third, the discourses that motivate the Australian version of 
neo-liberalism are unique in the way they separate economic and political concerns, recognise 
firms and employees as economic actors but redefine unions as political actors. This creates 
the basis for the de-legitimisation of unions as the subjects of regulation. In effect, these 
changes recast the relationship between labour and capital by denying their relevance as valid 
subjects for analysis, intervention or coordination (Mack 2005). Fourth, Australia’s labour 
market reforms are also underpinned by a different relationship between national and global 
capital, compared to the United States or United Kingdom. In Australia, capital’s ascendancy in 
the labour market is predicated on the largely unspoken threat of exit by trans-national 
corporations. McCallum (2005) sees the contemporary shifts in power over the labour market 
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as reflecting the fact that the nation state now effectively shares power with large trans-national 
corporations (via organisations such as the Business Council of Australia and the HR Nicholls 
Society). The influence of global markets is explicit in new regulations that permit employers to 
defuse wages pressure by importing guest labour from overseas.   
In sum, whilst the changes in Australia resonate with many aspects of Brenner and 
Theodore’s (2002) ‘spaces of neo-liberalism’, there are also important differences.  In Australia, 
as in other places, the shifting structures of regulation—what Brenner and Theodore (2002) call 
the ‘recalibration of intergovernmental relations’—are reshaping the wage relation and labour 
market institutions in the interests of capital. But in contrast to other places, they are achieving 
these reforms by centralizing industrial relations powers at the national scale in a manner that 
enables the localization of industrial relations practices. In stark contrast to Swyngedouw’s 
(1997) ‘glocalization’ thesis, the ‘localization’ of the sites of industrial relations practice is made 
possible by the use of stronger legislation that increases the authority of the nation scale. The 
empowerment of the national scale is at odds with the idea that the nation-state is ‘hollowing 
out’ under neo-liberalism.10  
Scales of Justice 
The Australian case also highlights the contradictory and power-laden nature of the politics of 
rescaling. In the years of the Australian Settlement, when the Australian political economy was 
framed by the doctrine known as the ‘Separation of Powers’, the decisions of the legal system 
could be based on universal principles of justice and fairness. Institutional structures and 
mechanisms were organized to neutralize the unequal power relations between the institutions 
of capital, labour and the state. Recent history reveals an increasing interdependence between 
the law, its regulatory interventions and economic policy frameworks. The result is the 
subordination of fairness to efficiency. When the law becomes an instrument of policy in a 
context in which state policies are inextricably embedded in the process of capitalist 
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accumulation, it becomes more difficult to uphold notions of justice and fairness (Mitchell 1998).  
This breaking down of the separation or ‘closure’ of the legal system from the messy business 
of politics (Blomley 1994) has enabled labour market law and regulation to be captured and 
dominated by economic considerations to the exclusion of social interests, the imperatives of 
social reproduction, or the maintenance of political legitimacy.   
Thus, changes in the industrial relations system can be interpreted as having placed 
limits on the scope of the law and altered the basis on which its deliberations rest.  Depending 
on your understanding of democracy, this represents either a victory or threat. Prime Minister 
John Howard’s populist view of democracy advocates parliamentary sovereignty underpinned 
by the common law and does not see a need for judicial oversight (Kelly 2005). Nonetheless, 
when basic rights are under threat, the legal system’s aspatial preoccupations with universal 
values such as justice, equity and fairness may be one of the few avenues through which an 
effective opposition can be developed. The independence of the judiciary provides a long term 
protection for democratic processes even if it makes it more difficult for progressive 
governments to enact reform.    
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
Different regulatory systems produce different geographical strategies and alter the practices of 
workers, unions and employers (Herod 1998).  These are intertwined, such that upheavals in 
labour market regulation are both a cause and an effect of changing structures and changing 
power relationships in the labour market and economy. Because processes of rescaling are 
constituted spatially, shifts in regulation and its associated practices produce shifts in the 
constitution and articulation of geographical scales. These shifts are inseparable from shifts in 
geometries of power.   
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However, the fact that changes to Australia’s system of employment regulation were 
produced, at different times, by quite different configurations of state power—from both 
progressive and conservative ‘sides’ of parliamentary politics—suggests that studies of 
rescaling need to look beyond the social construction of contemporary power structures to 
consider the factors that underlie their changing forms. Although contemporary geometries of 
power combine complex mixes of relationships that span multiple dimensions and scales, the 
legal frameworks in which they operate retain considerable rigidity. It is this lack of flexibility—in 
which Australia’s arbitral model of regulation could not be adapted to the needs of the new 
regime of accumulation or its configurations of power and influence—that led it to being 
sidelined. Changes in structures and jurisdictions were slow until the new Corporations-based 
source of power tilted the entire ‘tangled mesh’ of interactions onto a new trajectory. This 
experience shows that scale ‘jumping’ strategies developed for short-term political ends can 
have unintentional long term implications.    
Recent analyses of relational socio-spatial interactions have theorized scale relations 
as fluid and changeable, and as having the capacity to realign as the powers of constituent 
actors change. Thus, Swyngedouw (2004:133) argues that ‘spatial scales are never fixed, but 
are perpetually defined, contested and restructured in terms of their extent, content, relative 
importance and interrelations.’ This study has nevertheless shown that the extent and time 
horizons of changes in scaled geometries of power are often constrained. The force of the 
law—and the limits imposed on it by the Constitution—anchor socio-spatial scales to the extent 
that their configurations are never entirely the contingent outcome of short-term political 
struggles. In this paper’s example, power at different spatial scales was fixed by the 
Constitution until a new source of power was identified. The consequent shift in the 
mechanisms and apparatus of state action facilitated a re-ordering of scale and a realignment 
of powers and relationships, which have in turn profoundly reorganized the power geometries 
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between labour, capital and the state. In the absence of Constitutional amendments, however, 
these should be seen as temporary and reversible.   
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Endnotes
                                                     
1  In Australia, local governments have virtually no role in respect of industrial relations, social security 
or taxation. 
2  In Amalgamated Society of Engineers vs. Adelaide Steamship Company Co Ltd (1920), 28 CLR 129. 
Throughout this paper, I rely on Williams (1998) for legal references. 
3  In Commonwealth vs. Cigamatic Pty Ltd (in liquidation), 108 CLR 372. 
4  R vs Coldham; Ex parte Australian Social Welfare Union (CYSS Case), 153 CLR 297. 
5 In 1985, in Finance Sector Union of Australia; Ex parte Financial Clinic (Vic) Pty Ltd) the High Court 
extended the powers of the Industrial Court to superannuation. 
6 Quickenden vs. O’Connor and Ors (2001) 109 FCR 243. In the same year, the Court also 
reinterpreted the phrase ‘beyond one State’ in the ‘Conciliation and Arbitration’ power to enable the 
Federal scale to intervene in a wider range of industrial matters, but restricted the Commonwealth’s 
power to legislate on matters relating to ‘external affairs’ to the enactment of international treaties.  
7 Other legislation now covers superannuation, effectively removing it from the industrial arena. 
8 I am grateful to one of the anonymous referees for drawing this reference to my attention.  
9 Dingjan; Ex parte Wagner (1995) 183 CLR 323. 
10 Note however Peck’s (2001:447) nuanced definition of ‘hollowing-out’ as ‘not the state per se but a 
historically and geographical specific institutionalization of the state, which in turn is being replaced, not 
by fresh air and free markets, but by a reorganized state apparatus,’ which avoids understanding 
‘hollowing-out’ as an evacuation of the national scale. 
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Table 1 Australia’s Changing Industrial Relations Regulation 
 
 Australian  
Settlement 
(1904-1988) 
Hybrid 
Quasi-Corporatist 
(1988-1996) 
Neo-Liberal 
Roll-out 
(1996-) 
National Political-
Economy 
Context 
Keynesian demand 
management.  
 
Restructuring for 
‘international 
competitiveness.’  
Open market-oriented 
economy. 
Objective of 
Wages Policy 
Redistributive. Means to stimulate 
workplace reform. 
Reactive to global 
market forces. 
Wage Setting National and State 
Awards based on 
cost of living. 
National Awards 
increasingly linked to 
productivity. 
Minimum wage based 
on business 
conditions. 
Mode of 
Regulation 
Collectivist, multi-
employer. 
Enterprise-level 
bargaining 
superimposed 
collectivist structure. 
Individual Contracts 
superimposed on 
Enterprise-level 
agreements.  
Constitutional 
Source of Federal 
Power 
‘Conciliation and 
Arbitration’ power. 
Multiple powers. ‘Corporations’ power. 
Institutions of 
Regulation 
Australian 
Conciliation and 
Arbitration 
Commission.  
Largely independent 
of political power. 
 Australian Industrial 
Relations 
Commission.  
 
Increasingly subject 
to political influence. 
 
Australian Fair Pay 
Commission. 
 
 
Subject to political 
imperatives. 
 
Federal-State 
Relations 
Increasing Federal 
influence over State 
jurisdictions. 
Federal ascendancy 
in cooperative 
structure. 
Federal authority over 
State jurisdictions. 
Capital-Labor-
State Relations 
Institutionalisation of 
Capital and Labor 
relation. State as 
umpire.  
Quasi-Corporatist,. 
Institutionalised. 
State as stakeholder. 
State works to 
stimulate the market 
for labor.   
Spatial Effects Policies promote 
regional equality 
Marketization, but 
with compensations 
for disadvantaged 
regions.  
Policies promote 
regional and social 
inequalities 
 
 
 
